@feathersjs/authentication-client
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@feathersjs/errors | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the FeathersJS monorepo, same publisher (daffl), released in lockstep. Not a third-party unknown. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@feathersjs/commons | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the FeathersJS monorepo, same publisher (daffl), released in lockstep. Not a third-party unknown. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@feathersjs/feathers | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the FeathersJS monorepo, same publisher (daffl), released in lockstep. Not a third-party unknown. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@feathersjs/authentication | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the FeathersJS monorepo, same publisher (daffl), released in lockstep. Not a third-party unknown. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): FeathersJS does not use Sigstore provenance attestation; this is consistent across all versions and not a risk indicator for this established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.0.45 | 4 / 13 | |
| 5.0.44 | 4 / 13 | |
| 5.0.43 | 4 / 13 | |
| 5.0.42 | 4 / 13 | |
| 5.0.41 | 4 / 13 | |
| 5.0.40 | 4 / 13 | |
| 5.0.39 | 4 / 13 | |
| 5.0.37 | 4 / 13 | |
| 5.0.36 | 4 / 13 | |
| 5.0.35 | 4 / 13 | |
| 5.0.34 | 4 / 13 | |
| 4.5.19 | 5 / 15 |
v5.0.45
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (marshallswain) than the most recent previously approved version (daffl) on 2026-06-04, but marshallswain is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.0.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.43
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.42
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.41
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.40
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.39
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.37
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.36
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.35
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.34
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.5.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.