@feathersjs/client
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/rest.js | AI (source-diff): dist/rest.js is a standard webpack UMD browser bundle for the FeathersJS REST client. Network calls and module system are the package's intended functionality, not malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/rest.min.js | AI (source-diff): dist/rest.min.js is the minified companion to the webpack browser bundle. Same rationale as rest.js — legitimate browser client library artifact. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): FeathersJS monorepo does not use Sigstore provenance; this is consistent across all versions and poses no meaningful risk for this well-established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.0.45 | 5 / 17 | |
| 5.0.44 | 5 / 17 | |
| 5.0.43 | 5 / 17 | |
| 5.0.42 | 5 / 17 | |
| 5.0.41 | 5 / 17 | |
| 5.0.40 | 5 / 17 | |
| 5.0.39 | 5 / 17 | |
| 5.0.37 | 5 / 17 | |
| 5.0.36 | 5 / 17 | |
| 5.0.35 | 5 / 17 | |
| 5.0.34 | 5 / 17 | |
| 4.5.19 | 0 / 29 |
v5.0.45
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (marshallswain) than the most recent previously approved version (daffl) on 2026-06-04, but marshallswain is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.0.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.43
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.42
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.41
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.40
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.39
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.37
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.36
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.35
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.34
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.5.19
3 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.