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@ff-labs/fff-bin-darwin-x64

fff native binary for macOS x64 (Intel)

19
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

dmtr.kovalenko

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition from personal account to GitHub Actions CI is expected for automated releases; SLSA provenance attestation confirms legitimate CI/CD origin. ai
publish-pattern rapid-publish AI (publish-pattern): Automated CI/CD releasing multiple platform-specific binary packages in rapid succession is normal for this package family. ai
npm-metadata bundled-binaries AI (npm-metadata): Package is explicitly a platform-native binary distribution for fff.nvim; .dylib is the intended deliverable. ai

Versions (showing 19 of 19)

Version Deps Published
0.9.2 0 / 0
0.9.1 0 / 0
0.9.0 0 / 0
0.8.4 0 / 0
0.8.1 0 / 0
0.8.0 0 / 0
0.7.2 0 / 0
0.7.1 0 / 0
0.7.0 0 / 0
0.6.4 0 / 0
0.6.3 0 / 0
0.6.2 0 / 0
0.6.1 0 / 0
0.6.0 0 / 0
0.5.2 0 / 0
0.5.1 0 / 0
0.5.0 0 / 0
0.4.2 0 / 0
0.4.0 0 / 0

v0.9.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.9.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.9.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.8.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: dmtr.kovalenko → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-25) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.8.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.8.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.7.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.7.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.7.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.6.4

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • libfff_c.dylib

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.4.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.4.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.