@ff-labs/fff-bin-linux-x64-musl
fff native binary for Linux x64 (musl)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; repo ownership unchanged. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | rapid-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Automated CI/CD pipeline publishing multiple platform binaries in rapid succession is expected for this package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Package's sole purpose is distributing a prebuilt native shared library for the fff.nvim Neovim plugin; binary is the expected artifact. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.9.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.8.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.8.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.7.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.7.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.9.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • libfff_c.so
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.