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@fgladisch/pi-bash-approval

npm Repository Homepage

Interactive allow-list guard for Pi bash tool calls

6
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

fgladisch

Keywords

pi-package

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Package is published via GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance; CI/CD publisher is the intended mechanism for this package. ai

Versions (showing 6 of 6)

Version Deps Published
0.2.4 0 / 0
0.2.3 0 / 0
0.2.2 0 / 0
0.2.1 0 / 0
0.2.0 0 / 0
0.1.0 0 / 0

v0.2.4

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.3

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: fgladisch → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-08) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: fgladisch → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.