@figma/code-connect
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:fast-fuzzy | AI (dependencies): fast-fuzzy is a legitimate fuzzy-search library; its use in a design-tool CLI is expected and benign. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Figma-published package with strong ecosystem trust; lack of Sigstore attestation is common and not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Official Figma CLI tool; sparse README/keywords are a packaging style choice, not spam indicators. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.7 | 22 / 22 | |
| 1.4.4 | 22 / 22 | |
| 1.3.13 | 22 / 23 | |
| 1.3.6 | 22 / 23 | |
| 1.3.4 | 22 / 23 |
v1.4.7
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (islobodiuk) than the most recent previously approved version (christinabannister-figma) on 2026-05-28, but islobodiuk is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.3.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.