@financial-times/pg-static-loader
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal FT monorepo utility; sparse metadata is expected for scoped org packages, not a spam/phishing indicator. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent with internal tooling under @financial-times scope; not a malware signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 2 |
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.