@financial-times/x-interaction
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:@financial-times/x-rollup | AI (npm-metadata): file: reference is a devDependency in a monorepo; not shipped to consumers. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | url-dep:@financial-times/x-test-utils | AI (npm-metadata): file: reference is a devDependency in a monorepo; not shipped to consumers. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 20.0.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 20.0.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 19.0.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 19.0.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 18.2.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 18.2.0 | 2 / 3 |
v20.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v20.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v19.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v19.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.