@fireproof/core-gateways-cloud
Live ledger for the web.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher is documented by SLSA provenance attestation; expected for this org's release pipeline. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@fireproof/vendor | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope (@fireproof); likely a workspace/monorepo peer dep, stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 27 of 27)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.24.19 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.16 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.15 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.14 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.13 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.12 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.11 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.10 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.9 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.8 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.7 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.6 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.5 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.24.0 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.15 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.14 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.13 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.11 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.10 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.8 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.7 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.6 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.5 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.3 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.2 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.1 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.23.0 | 9 / 0 |
v0.24.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.23.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.23.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.23.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.23.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.