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@fireproof/core-types-base

npm Repository Homepage
28
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

jchrisfastandfearless

Keywords

ledgerJSONdocumentIPLDCIDIPFS

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA provenance is a standard supply-chain hardening move for this org. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@fireproof/vendor AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped package declared as dep; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for this package. ai

Versions (showing 28 of 28)

Version Deps Published
0.24.19 8 / 0
0.24.16 8 / 0
0.24.15 8 / 0
0.24.14 8 / 0
0.24.13 8 / 0
0.24.12 8 / 0
0.24.11 8 / 0
0.24.10 8 / 0
0.24.9 8 / 0
0.24.8 8 / 0
0.24.7 8 / 0
0.24.6 8 / 0
0.24.5 8 / 0
0.24.4 8 / 0
0.24.0 8 / 0
0.23.15 8 / 0
0.23.14 8 / 0
0.23.13 6 / 0
0.23.11 6 / 0
0.23.10 6 / 0
0.23.8 6 / 0
0.23.7 6 / 0
0.23.6 6 / 0
0.23.5 6 / 0
0.23.3 6 / 0
0.23.2 6 / 0
0.23.1 6 / 0
0.23.0 6 / 0

v0.24.16

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-28) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.15

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-27) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.14

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-27) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.13

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.12

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.11

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.10

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-31) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.9

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.8

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.7

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-10) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.6

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.5

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jchris → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.23.15

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.23.14

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.23.13

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.23.11

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.23.10

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.23.8

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.23.7

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.23.6

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.23.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.23.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.23.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.23.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.23.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.