@firestitch/audit
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
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Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 18.0.14 | 1 / 0 | |
| 18.0.13 | 1 / 0 | |
| 18.0.12 | 1 / 0 | |
| 18.0.11 | 1 / 0 | |
| 18.0.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 18.0.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 18.0.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 18.0.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 18.0.6 | 1 / 0 |
v18.0.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v18.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v18.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v18.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v18.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v18.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.