@fiscozen/composables
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@fiscozen/style | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal org package; missing repo/keywords/README conventions are stable across all @fiscozen packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 17 | |
| 0.1.38 | 1 / 17 |
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.38
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.