@fiscozen/dropdown
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@fiscozen/composables | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for monorepo/design-system packages. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal design system component; missing README/repo/keywords is expected for private org packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.7 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.0.6 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.0.5 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.0.3 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.0.2 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 18 |
v1.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.