@flopflip/adapter-utilities
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is confirmed legitimate by SLSA provenance attestation; consistent with CI/CD automation for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/runtime | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep used by transpiled output; not directly imported in source but legitimately required. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 15.1.10 | 4 / 3 | |
| 15.1.9 | 4 / 3 | |
| 15.1.7 | 4 / 3 | |
| 15.1.6 | 4 / 3 | |
| 15.1.5 | 4 / 3 | |
| 15.1.4 | 4 / 3 | |
| 15.1.3 | 4 / 3 | |
| 15.1.2 | 4 / 3 | |
| 15.1.1 | 4 / 3 | |
| 15.1.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 15.0.1 | 4 / 3 |
v15.1.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.1.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v15.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v15.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.