@forge/cli-shared
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): CLI tool legitimately spawns subprocesses (e.g., docker-compose, cross-spawn dep); stable pattern across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.23.0 | 33 / 21 | |
| 8.22.0 | 32 / 20 | |
| 8.21.0 | 32 / 20 | |
| 8.20.0 | 32 / 20 | |
| 8.19.0 | 32 / 20 | |
| 8.18.0 | 32 / 20 |
v8.23.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.22.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.21.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.19.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.18.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.