@forge/runtime
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-bulk-read | AI (semgrep): Reads process.env only to filter FORGE_USER_VAR_ prefixed keys; intentional and safe for this runtime package. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.1.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 6.1.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 6.1.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 6.1.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 6.0.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 6.0.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 6.0.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 6.0.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 6.0.0 | 0 / 3 |
v6.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.