@form-create/component-antdv-group
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index.es.js | AI (source-diff): CSS injection via createElement('style') in a bundled Vue component; no actual network calls or malicious exec. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.3.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 3.2.38 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.2.34 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.7.27 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.7.17 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.7.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.6.3 | 1 / 0 |
v3.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.38
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.7.27
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.7.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.7.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.