@formatjs/cli-lib
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): formatjs monorepo migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate automated release pipeline. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a standard TypeScript runtime helper; implicit dependency pattern is stable for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/node | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only package; framework-scoped, loaded by convention in TypeScript projects. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/estree | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only package; framework-scoped, loaded by convention. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:commander | AI (phantom-deps): CLI library; commander is a declared runtime dep used by the CLI entry point, not a phantom. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/fs-extra | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only package; framework-scoped, loaded by convention. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@formatjs/icu-skeleton-parser | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org formatjs dep; declared runtime dependency, stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:loud-rejection | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep for unhandled promise rejection handling; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:fast-glob | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep for file globbing in CLI; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 34 of 34)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.7.8 | 11 / 0 | |
| 8.7.7 | 11 / 0 | |
| 8.7.6 | 11 / 0 | |
| 8.7.5 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.7.4 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.7.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.7.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.7.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.6.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.5.5 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.5.4 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.5.3 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.5.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.5.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.5.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.4.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.4.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.3.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 8.3.1 | 13 / 0 | |
| 8.3.0 | 13 / 0 | |
| 8.2.3 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.2.2 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.2.1 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.2.0 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.1.1 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.1.0 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.0.8 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.0.7 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.0.6 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.0.5 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.0.4 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.0.2 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.0.1 | 14 / 0 | |
| 8.0.0 | 14 / 0 |
v8.7.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.7.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.7.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.7.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.7.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.7.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.5.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.