@forumone/throughline-publishing
Policy-gated publishing server for Throughline. Wraps Payload's update operation with composition, accessibility, required-field, embargo, and approval gating.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from personal account to GitHub Actions CI/CD; consistent with org monorepo automation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Org-level maintainer roster change accompanying CI/CD transition; not a takeover signal. | ai |
v0.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.