@forumone/throughline-workflows
Composable Inngest function factories for the Throughline framework — revalidation, scheduled publishing, approval expiration, audit fan-out, healthcheck.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from individual to GitHub Actions CI publishing for @forumone org monorepo. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Sibling package in same monorepo at matching version; not a supply-chain injection vector. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): GitHub Actions publisher; provenance absence is common and no other risk signals present. | ai |
v0.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.