@forwardimpact/libskill
Derivation engine for roles, skills, and agent team profiles
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Scoped monorepo package; provenance absence is common and no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 30 of 30)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.5.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.5.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.5.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.4.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.3.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.3.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.2.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.2.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.2.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.2.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.2.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.1.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.1.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.1.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.1.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.1.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.1.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.1.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 0 |
v5.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.