@forwardimpact/svcllm
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all versions of this package; org does not use Sigstore attestation. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.98 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.97 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.96 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.94 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.93 | 4 / 1 |
v0.1.98
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.97
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.96
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.94
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.93
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.