@forwardimpact/svcweb
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): Raw IP is localhost/127.0.0.1 in a CORS origin allowlist — standard dev pattern, not exfiltration. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.7 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.6 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.5 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.3 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 8 / 1 |
v0.1.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.