@frontify/fondue-icons
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@frontify/fondue-tokens | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org runtime dependency; phantom-dep heuristic fires because it's not directly imported in source but is a legitimate declared dep. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.27.0 | 1 / 36 | |
| 0.26.3 | 1 / 36 | |
| 0.26.2 | 1 / 32 | |
| 0.26.1 | 1 / 32 | |
| 0.26.0 | 1 / 31 | |
| 0.25.0 | 1 / 31 | |
| 0.24.1 | 1 / 31 | |
| 0.23.0 | 1 / 31 | |
| 0.22.0 | 1 / 32 |
v0.27.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.25.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.23.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (frontify-dev) on 2026-01-30, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.22.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.