@fugood/llama.node
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Runs scripts/check.js to select the correct platform binary; standard pattern for this native binding package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require loads the platform-specific optional dependency by name; intentional and documented pattern for this binding. | ai |
v1.7.2
2 findingsScript: node scripts/check.js
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.1
2 findingsScript: node scripts/check.js
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.0
2 findingsScript: node scripts/check.js
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.