@fullcalendar/angular
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
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Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.1.20 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.1.19 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.1.18 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.1.17 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.1.16 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.1.15 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.1.14 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.1.13 | 1 / 0 |
v6.1.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.1.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.1.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.1.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.