@galacean/effects
Galacean Effects runtime player for the web
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Long-established Ant Group package; no provenance has been stable across all 252 versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@galacean/effects-core | AI (dependencies): Same-org sibling package pinned to exact matching version; not a third-party risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@galacean/effects-webgl | AI (dependencies): Same-org sibling package pinned to exact matching version; not a third-party risk. | ai |
v2.9.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.11
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.