@galacean/effects-core
Galacean Effects runtime core for the web
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:yufangjun.com | AI (email-domain): Established Ant Group package with long history; domain risk is theoretical for this well-known org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:uuid | AI (phantom-deps): uuid is a declared dep used indirectly via build/config; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:libtess | AI (phantom-deps): libtess is a declared dep used indirectly; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
v2.8.11
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.10
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.