@galacean/engine
<a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/@galacean/engine"><img src="https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@galacean/engine"/></a>  : Stale contact metadata on a long-standing, widely-used engine package; no exploit behavior observed. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Provenance-attested publish confirms legitimate org-controlled transition, not compromise. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with long history; lack of provenance is consistent across all prior versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.6.13 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.6.12 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.6.11 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.6.10 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.6.9 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.5.16 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.1.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.1.3 | 4 / 0 |
v1.6.12
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (husong) than the most recent previously approved version (zhanyingwei) on 2025-12-26, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.6.11
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (husong) than the most recent previously approved version (zhanyingwei) on 2025-11-28, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.6.10
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (husong) than the most recent previously approved version (zhanyingwei) on 2025-11-28, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.6.9
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (husong) than the most recent previously approved version (zhanyingwei) on 2025-11-28, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.5.16
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (husong) than the most recent previously approved version (zhanyingwei) on 2025-12-04, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.1.3
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.