@galacean/engine-rhi-webgl
A subpackage of `@galacean/engine`.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): husong is an established publisher (14 approved, 0 rejected) with SLSA attestation; transition appears legitimate for this org. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:yufangjun.com | AI (email-domain): SLSA provenance attestation mitigates domain-hijack risk; established ecosystem package with long history. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@galacean/engine-core | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; peer/runtime dep pattern, not a phantom dep risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@galacean/engine-math | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; peer/runtime dep pattern, not a phantom dep risk. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Large established monorepo package; sparse README and no keywords are typical for sub-packages in this ecosystem. | ai |
Versions (showing 33 of 33)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.6.13 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.12 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.11 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.10 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.9 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.8 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.7 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.6 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.6.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.16 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.15 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.14 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.13 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.12 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.11 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.10 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.9 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.8 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.7 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.6 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.5.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.4.16 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.1.6 | 2 / 1 |
v1.6.13
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.12
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.11
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.10
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.9
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.8
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.16
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yufangjun.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.