@galaxy-tool-util/cli
galaxy-tool-cache CLI — cache and inspect Galaxy tool metadata
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/commands/cytoscapejs/_template-bundled.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long line is an inlined HTML template string in a .d.ts declaration file — readable, benign CytoscapeJS visualization template. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from jmchilton to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA provenance; consistent with legitimate automation migration. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): GitHub Actions CI publish environments often omit gitHead; SLSA provenance attestation provides stronger commit linkage. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Size increase consistent with bundled templates (bundle-templates.mjs build step) and 1.0.0 feature expansion. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): 4x size increase explained by template bundling step added to build script alongside nunjucks dep. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped monorepo package; no brand/name similarity to joi beyond edit distance artifact. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 1.4.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 1.3.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 1.2.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.4.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.2.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 6 / 1 |
v1.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.3.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.2.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.