@gapi/sequelize
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Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:sequelize | AI (dependencies): sequelize is a widely-used, established ORM; unvetted status reflects registry gap, not a real risk for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Long-lived package predating Sigstore provenance; absence is expected and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.8.218 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.8.217 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.8.216 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.8.215 | 2 / 1 |
v1.8.218
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.216
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.8.215
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.