@gem-sdk/adapter-shopify
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal monorepo SDK package; sparse metadata is structural, not indicative of spam/malice across 204 versions. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent pattern across all versions of this scoped SDK package; not a malice signal. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance across all 204 versions; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 16.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 13.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 13.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 11.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.0 | 1 / 0 |
v13.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.