@gencode/shared
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped internal/shared utility package; sparse metadata is consistent across all versions, not a malware indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.19 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.18 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.17 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.8 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.7 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 4 |
v0.2.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jardenliu) than the most recent previously approved version (liangshuai) on 2026-05-27, but jardenliu is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.