@geode/opengeodeweb-back
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing backed by SLSA Sigstore attestation; consistent with org automation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@geode/opengeodeweb-microservice | AI (phantom-deps): Build-time-only dep used via npm script, not a direct import; stable FP for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 33 of 33)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.9.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.8.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.8.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.7.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.7.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.6.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.5.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.5.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.5.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.4.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.3.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.3.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.3.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.3.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.1.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.1.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.15.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.14.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.14.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.14.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.14.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.14.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.13.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.13.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.12.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.11.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.11.1 | 1 / 0 |
v6.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.15.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.14.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.14.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.14.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.14.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.13.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.13.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.12.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.11.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.11.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.