@geode/opengeodeweb-viewer
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Org uses GitHub Actions for automated publishing; SLSA attestation confirms CI/CD provenance for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@geode/opengeodeweb-microservice | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep used as build-time generator via npx; not imported at runtime. Stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Package ships a single JSON schema file; minimal README and no keywords are expected for this utility package. | ai |
Versions (showing 38 of 38)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.22.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.21.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.20.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.19.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.18.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.17.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.17.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.17.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.16.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.16.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.15.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.15.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.15.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.15.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.15.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.15.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.15.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.15.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.15.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.14.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.13.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.13.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.13.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.13.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.12.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.11.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.11.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.11.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.11.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.11.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.10.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.10.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.9.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.9.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.8.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.8.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.7.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.7.0 | 1 / 0 |
v1.22.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.21.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.19.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.18.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.16.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.16.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.14.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.13.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.13.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.13.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.13.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.11.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: geode.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.10.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.9.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.