@gershy/util-hash
TODO
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.15 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.14 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.13 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.12 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.10 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.9 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.8 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 3 |
v0.0.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.