@getpara/wagmi-v2-connector
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established @getpara org package; missing metadata is a style issue, not a spam indicator. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent across all @getpara packages; not a malice signal. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): @getpara packages consistently lack provenance; not a risk for this org. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.32.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.32.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.31.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.28.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.27.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.17.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.16.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.15.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.9.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.4.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.3.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.2.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.1.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 3 |
v3.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (nsquare) than the most recent previously approved version (tbosch) on 2026-06-05, but nsquare is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (tbosch) than the most recent previously approved version (nsquare) on 2026-05-28, but tbosch is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.32.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.32.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.31.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.28.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.27.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.17.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.16.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.9.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.