@gjsify/example-dom-three-extrude-shapes
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Intentional minimal example/demo package; tiny payload and missing metadata are expected for this type of package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@gjsify/webgl | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep declared as runtime dependency in an example package; not directly imported but legitimately listed. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.7 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.1.6 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.1.5 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.1.4 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.1.3 | 1 / 9 |
v0.1.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.