@gluestack-ui/actionsheet
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Gluestack-ui org consistently publishes without provenance; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.53 | 7 / 10 | |
| 0.2.52 | 7 / 10 | |
| 0.2.51 | 7 / 10 | |
| 0.2.50 | 7 / 10 | |
| 0.2.49 | 7 / 10 | |
| 0.2.48 | 7 / 10 | |
| 0.2.47 | 7 / 10 | |
| 0.2.46 | 7 / 10 | |
| 0.2.45 | 7 / 10 | |
| 0.2.44 | 7 / 10 | |
| 0.2.43 | 7 / 10 | |
| 0.2.42 | 7 / 10 |
v0.2.52
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.51
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.50
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (gluestackadmin) than the most recent previously approved version (madhavb230100) on 2025-02-19, but gluestackadmin is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.49
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (madhavb230100) than the most recent previously approved version (geekgautam) on 2025-02-18, but madhavb230100 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.48
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (madhavb230100) than the most recent previously approved version (geekgautam) on 2025-02-18, but madhavb230100 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.47
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (geekgautam) than the most recent previously approved version (madhavb230100) on 2025-02-18, but geekgautam is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.46
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.45
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.44
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.43
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.42
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.