@gmod/bbi
Parser for BigWig/BigBed files
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/wasm/inflate-wasm-inlined.mjs | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled inline WASM module; expected build artifact for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:src/wasm/inflate-wasm-inlined.mjs | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled inline WASM module; expected build artifact for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:esm/wasm/inflate-wasm-inlined.mjs | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled inline WASM module; expected build artifact for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publishing with SLSA attestation; legitimate CI/CD migration by the same maintainer. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy explained by CI/CD migration; SLSA provenance confirms legitimate publish pipeline. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/wasm/inflate-wasm-inlined.js | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled WASM inflate module; long lines are base64-encoded WASM binary, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:src/wasm/inflate-wasm-inlined.js | AI (source-diff): Same webpack/WASM bundle pattern; stable for this bioinformatics package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:esm/wasm/inflate-wasm-inlined.js | AI (source-diff): Same webpack/WASM bundle pattern; stable for this bioinformatics package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:pako-esm2 | AI (phantom-deps): Config-only reference to pako-esm2; not a runtime import, stable false positive. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped bioinformatics package @gmod/bbi; Levenshtein match to 'joi' is a false positive with no plausible impersonation intent. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.2.0 | 3 / 14 | |
| 9.1.0 | 3 / 14 | |
| 9.0.17 | 3 / 14 | |
| 9.0.16 | 3 / 14 | |
| 9.0.15 | 3 / 14 | |
| 9.0.13 | 3 / 14 | |
| 9.0.12 | 3 / 14 | |
| 9.0.11 | 3 / 14 | |
| 9.0.9 | 3 / 15 | |
| 9.0.8 | 3 / 15 | |
| 9.0.7 | 3 / 15 | |
| 9.0.6 | 3 / 15 | |
| 9.0.5 | 3 / 15 | |
| 9.0.4 | 3 / 17 | |
| 9.0.3 | 3 / 17 | |
| 9.0.0 | 3 / 17 | |
| 8.1.2 | 5 / 18 | |
| 8.1.1 | 5 / 17 | |
| 8.1.0 | 5 / 17 | |
| 8.0.4 | 5 / 16 | |
| 8.0.3 | 5 / 16 | |
| 8.0.2 | 5 / 16 | |
| 8.0.1 | 5 / 16 | |
| 8.0.0 | 5 / 16 | |
| 7.1.0 | 5 / 14 |
v9.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.16
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.15
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.13
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.2
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.