@golar/astro-darwin-arm64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher with SLSA provenance attestation is a legitimate and more secure publishing pattern. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): No-dep, no-description pattern is expected for a platform-specific binary distribution package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binary package; the binary is the intended deliverable, built with SLSA provenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • golar-astro
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • golar-astro
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • golar-astro
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • golar-astro
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.