@gooddata/api-client-tiger
API Client for GoodData Cloud and GoodData.CN
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:rodri360.com | AI (email-domain): Long-established GoodData CI publisher with strong track record; stale maintainer email is low risk for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@gooddata/sdk-model | AI (dependencies): First-party GoodData monorepo sibling dependency; stable pattern across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a declared runtime dependency in package.json; phantom-dep is a false positive here. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Large established SDK monorepo; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.40.0 | 5 / 28 | |
| 11.39.0 | 5 / 28 | |
| 11.38.0 | 5 / 28 | |
| 11.37.0 | 5 / 28 | |
| 11.36.0 | 5 / 28 | |
| 11.35.0 | 5 / 28 | |
| 11.34.0 | 5 / 28 | |
| 11.33.0 | 5 / 28 | |
| 11.32.0 | 5 / 28 | |
| 11.31.0 | 5 / 28 | |
| 11.30.0 | 5 / 28 | |
| 11.29.0 | 5 / 28 | |
| 11.28.0 | 5 / 28 |
v11.40.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.39.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.38.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.37.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.36.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.35.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.34.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.33.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.30.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.29.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.28.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.