@gooddata/reference-workspace
GoodData SDK - Reference Workspace for tests
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:rodri360.com | AI (email-domain): Package is published by gooddata-ci CI account with 430 approvals; stale maintainer email is low risk for this established org package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Large established monorepo package; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions and not a new signal. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a standard TypeScript runtime implicit dep in monorepo builds; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash-es | AI (phantom-deps): lodash-es referenced in config files in this monorepo package; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@gooddata/sdk-backend-spi | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dep; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for peer/type-only usage. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.40.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 11.39.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 11.38.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 11.37.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 11.36.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 11.35.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 11.34.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 11.33.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 11.32.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 11.31.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 11.30.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 11.29.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 11.28.0 | 4 / 20 |
v11.40.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.39.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.38.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.37.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.36.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.35.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.34.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.33.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.31.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.30.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.29.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.28.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.