@gooddata/sdk-code-schemas
GoodData AAC JSON Schema types and compiled schemas
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:rodri360.com | AI (email-domain): GoodData org package with strong CI publisher history; stale maintainer email is a hygiene issue, not an active threat vector here. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): GoodData CI publishes consistently without provenance; stable pattern across 62 approved packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.40.0 | 0 / 24 | |
| 11.39.0 | 0 / 24 | |
| 11.38.0 | 0 / 24 | |
| 11.37.0 | 0 / 24 | |
| 11.36.0 | 0 / 24 | |
| 11.35.0 | 0 / 25 | |
| 11.34.0 | 0 / 25 | |
| 11.33.0 | 0 / 25 | |
| 11.32.0 | 0 / 25 | |
| 11.31.0 | 0 / 25 | |
| 11.30.0 | 0 / 25 | |
| 11.29.0 | 0 / 25 | |
| 11.28.0 | 0 / 25 |
v11.40.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.39.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.38.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.37.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.36.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.35.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.34.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.33.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.30.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.29.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.28.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rodri360.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.