@gooddollar/goodcollective-contracts
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Contracts artifact package under established GoodDollar org; sparse metadata is normal for this package type. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Same rationale — contracts artifact package, missing description is benign here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.2 | 0 / 34 | |
| 1.4.1 | 0 / 34 | |
| 1.4.0 | 0 / 36 | |
| 1.3.1 | 0 / 36 |
v1.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.