@google-cloud/kms
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:koa | AI (typosquat): @google-cloud/kms is the official Google Cloud KMS client; the scoped namespace makes Levenshtein comparison to 'koa' a stable false positive. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): @google-cloud/kms is the official Google Cloud KMS client; the scoped namespace makes Levenshtein comparison to 'qs' a stable false positive. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Google's automated publishing pipeline for this package does not include Sigstore provenance; this is consistent across all versions and not a security concern given the trusted publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.5.1 | 1 / 14 | |
| 5.5.0 | 1 / 15 | |
| 5.4.0 | 1 / 15 | |
| 5.2.1 | 1 / 15 | |
| 5.2.0 | 1 / 15 | |
| 5.1.0 | 1 / 15 |
v5.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.