@googleapis/docs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Official Google API client under @googleapis scope; no relation to 'cors' package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.3.0 | 1 / 8 | |
| 9.2.1 | 1 / 8 | |
| 9.2.0 | 1 / 8 | |
| 9.1.0 | 1 / 8 | |
| 9.0.0 | 1 / 8 |
v9.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.