@graphql-hive/router-query-planner
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from theguild-bot to GitHub Actions CI publisher; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate CI/CD pipeline. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): NAPI-RS native addon; platform-specific .node binaries are the intended artifact, backed by SLSA provenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 28 of 28)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.43 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.42 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.41 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.40 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.39 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.38 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.37 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.36 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.35 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.34 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.33 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.32 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.31 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.29 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.28 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.27 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.26 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.25 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.24 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.23 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.22 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.21 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.20 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.19 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.18 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.17 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.16 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.15 | 0 / 2 |
v0.0.43
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.42
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.41
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.40
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.39
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.38
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.36
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.17
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (theguild-bot) on 2026-04-01, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.