@graphql-yoga/plugin-defer-stream
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 51 of 55)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.21.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.21.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.20.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.19.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.18.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.18.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.17.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.17.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.16.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.16.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.16.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.15.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.15.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.15.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.14.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.13.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.13.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.13.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.13.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.13.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.13.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.12.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.12.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.12.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.11.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.10.11 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.10.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.10.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.10.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.10.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.10.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.10.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.10.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.10.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.10.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.10.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.10.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.9.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.8.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.7.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.6.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.6.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.6.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.6.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.5.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.4.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 0 |
v3.13.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (theguild-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (dotansimha) on 2025-04-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.13.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (theguild-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (dotansimha) on 2025-04-09, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.13.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.